are comfortable with his arguments that purport to establish the authority of the 20 moral law. The sticking point-or, for those less favorably disposed to Kantian 21 morality, the breaking point-is the prominent role played by freedom. In Kant's 22 hands, the innocuous and commonsense view that morality has authority only 23 for those capable of acting morally engenders a thorny philosophical problem.
around the Groundwork's failed theoretical demonstration, while rebutting charges 147 a commitment to the moral law is implicit in the fundamental norms of practical reason. They conclude that anyone who reasons practically is free in the Kantian sense. While I have sympathy with constructivism, there are two important differences in our approach. First, constructivists shoulder an enormous argumentative burden when they claim that the moral law really is the fundamental norm of practical reasoning. I make no such claims, which are unnecessary in any case: Kant does not think that practical reason, minimally construed, implies a commitment to the moral law (KpV 47). Second, and more important, constructivists lack an adequate explanation of the efficacity of moral judgment, which I provide below.
guide deliberation about the premises employed in practical reasoning. Looking as the 'normative' aspect (Ameriks [2003: 252-53 refers to the capacity to be moved to act by pure rational principles and the practical 216 judgments in which they figure (G 445-47). An unfree will is moved to act by a 217 sensible attraction to an object. Both aspects are necessary for freedom, and a will 218 in which just one obtains is not free.
219
My interpretation of Kant's demonstration of freedom naturally divides into 220 two sections, one focusing on freedom L , the other freedom E . In the first section, 221 which defends an expanded version of the first premise of the orthodox argument,
222
I argue that Kant is committed to the following claim: we actualize our capacity 223 for freedom L by making the moral law the fundamental law of our will. In 224 brief, we make the moral law the law of our will by bringing about the 225 normative determination of the will by the moral law-hence the practical nature 226 of the demonstration. We bring about the normative determination of the will 227 by the moral law by using the moral law to regulate our choice of practical we can bring about the determination of our will by pure rational principles and 250 make the moral law the fundamental law of our will. we are to will. They tell us only how we are to will-we are to will in such a way 270 that our practical judgments are ultimately governed by universal lawfulness. will by a principle is simply to take it as a normative standard and to consider 16 This resembles Korsgaard's claim that 'by acting morally, we can make ourselves free' (Korsgaard 1996: 176) . I agree with a slightly weakened formulation: we make ourselves free in the sense that we demonstrate our freedom by actualizing it. But I disagree with Korsgaard's underlying argument, which relies heavily on Kantian respect. In Korsgaard's eyes, respect is supposed to explain the normative and motivational determination of the will by pure practical reason. But respect cannot fill this explanatory role, since respect presupposes the fact that the will can be so determined. Furthermore, Kant says that while respect 'indirectly' determines the will (KpV 79), we are free only when the moral law immediately determines the will, i.e., when the moral law regulates a moral judgment, which in turn generates a moral motive. And it must be the case that respect only indirectly determines the will, because if it directly determined the will, or was the ground of the determination of the will by the moral law, Kant's moral theory would collapse into the moral sense theory he so strongly opposes. The same issue affects Franks's (2005: 295ff.) 'performative' interpretation of Kant's demonstration of freedom, which locates the demonstration in the production of the feeling of respect.
17 My conclusion also tames Kant's assertion that the consciousness of the authority of the moral law is 'identical with' consciousness of our freedom (KpV 42; see also This fact provides rational grounds for believing that our attempts at actualizing 634 freedom will be successful and that we do therefore possess the requisite capacity.
635
To be sure, as cognitively limited beings subject to psychological self-deception, we 
